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HE man and woman who were parties to the suit on appeal in In
re Marriage of Braddock' had been married and divorced. In 1994
they began living together again. Later that year the woman con-
veyed real property to the man with the apparent object of supplying him
with collateral for a loan of $45,000. The woman also guaranteed the
loan. The man promised to reconvey the land. After some of the money
had been repaid to the man, he nevertheless refused to reconvey the
property to the woman, and she brought suit for divorce from an alleged
informal marriage. The trial court, however, found insufficient evidence
to support an informal marriage. But the facts showed that the woman
placed a great deal of trust in the man and hence there was a confidential
relationship between them. The man's breach of his agreement to recon-
vey therefore provided a ground for imposing a constructive trust on the
property in favor of the woman on the basis of a constructive as well as an
actual fraud. 2 In 1982 a similar situation arose involving female cohabit-
ants in Small v. Harper.3
Despite the usual spate of literature on unisexual unions, however,
Texas made no discernable development on that subject.
B. INFORMAL MARRIAGE
A couple's holding themselves out publicly as being married is a vital
element in proving an informal marriage. In Knight v. Volkart-Knight,4 as
in Winfield v. Renfro,5 the court found that the evidence was insufficient
to support a public holding out by the alleged wife. In both cases only a
small circle of family, friends, and fellow employees knew of the alleged
marriage. In Knight the fact that each alleged spouse filed a federal in-
come tax return as a single person and both received a loan as single co-
borrowers also detracted from the alleged wife's assertion. In response to
being asked why the couple had not sought either a religious or civil cere-
monial marriage, she testified that "they did not want public acknowledg-
ment of their marriage."'6 The couple lived together for only about ten
months and during that time the woman did not use the man's name. The
court did not find it necessary to consider the other two statutory ele-
ments of an informal marriage. 7
1. 64 S.W.3d 581 (Tex. App.-Texarkana 2001, no pet.).
2. Id. at 586-87.
3. 638 S.W.2d 24 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1982, no writ).
4. No. 13-00-514-CV, 2001 WL 892250, at *1 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 2001, no
pet.).
5. 821 S.W.2d 640, 640 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1991, writ. denied), noted in
Joseph W. McKnight, Family Law: Husband and Wife, 45 Sw. L.J. 1831, 1833-34 (1992).
6. Knight, 2001 WL 892250, at *2.
7. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 2.401(a)(2) (Vernon 1998).
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The alleged wife in Amaye v. Oravetz8 had the burden of proving her
alleged marriage because she did not file her petition until over two years
had passed after the couple had ceased living together.9 In any case, that
burden of proof rests upon the petitioner even in the absence of the stat-
ute, whether the marriage is formal or informal. The alleged husband's
defense was stated in a motion for summary judgment supported by his
affidavit that no marriage existed between him and the petitioner, that
they had not agreed to be married, and that over six years had elapsed
since the parties had ceased living together. The court granted the re-
spondent's motion. The appellate court held that the alleged wife "was
required to present more than a scintilla of evidence" to defeat the re-
spondent's motion for summary judgment and that she had failed to do
so.10
C. PERSONAL RIGHTS
In Clayton v. Richards" a husband brought suit for invasion of privacy
against his then estranged wife and her assisting private investigator, who
had secretly installed a hidden video-camera in the husband's bedroom.
Both defendants sought summary judgment on the pleadings. The wife's
motion was denied. The wife's agent's case was severed from that of the
wife and his motion was granted. The husband appealed. The Texarkana
Court of Appeals reversed the judgment of the trial court and remanded
the case for trial. On the basis of the facts underlying the agent-defen-
dant's motion, the appellate court concluded that the wife's acts, if
proved, could be tortious, though a spouse with equal rights of access to a
shared bedroom might, without liability, "as an invasion of privacy...
open the door of the bedroom and view [the other] spouse in bed.... The
videotaping of a person without consent or awareness when there is an
expectation of privacy, however, goes beyond the rights of a spouse be-
cause it may record private matters, which could later be exposed to the
public eye." Hence if on the facts of this case the wife's acts were tor-
tious, and if her agent knowingly aided her in the commission of the acts,
then his acts were tortious also.12
D. DIVORCE JURISDICTION
In Goodenbour v. Goodenbour13 the court considered whether Texas
was the last marital residence of the parties in order to determine
whether a Texas court had jurisdiction to grant the wife's petition for di-
vorce. The family had lived in the state of Washington until the husband
took a job in New Zealand in 1996. The wife decided to staybehind with
8. 57 S.W.3d 581 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2001, no pet.).
9. See TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 2.401(b) (Vernon 1998).
10. Amaye, 57 S.W.3d at 584.
11. 47 S.W.3d 149 (Tex. App.-Texarkana 2001, no pet.).
12. Id. at 155-56.
13. 64 S.W.3d 69 (Tex. App.-Austin 2001, no pet.).
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the children until 1997. Then she was offered a job in Texas and moved
to Austin. The husband still hoped to convince his wife to move to New
Zealand, but she preferred to stay in Texas where the husband visited the
family in early 1998. Though the husband opposed the purchase of a
house in Texas and returned to work in the Far East, a house was bought
with his approval in the names of both spouses, and the husband contin-
ued to visit the wife and children in Texas. For that year the spouses filed
a joint federal income tax return from Austin, and the husband filed a
non-resident tax return in New Zealand. In 1999 the wife filed her peti-
tion for divorce in Texas and the husband was served with a citation in
New Zealand. He then filed a petition for divorce within in a week, and
the wife received a citation from the New Zealand court. The husband
answered in Texas with a special appearance to contest the court's juris-
diction. The trial court held that there was insufficient evidence to estab-
lish general or special jurisdiction over the husband and that the wife had
failed to establish that Texas was the couple's last marital residence under
Family Code section 6.305(a)(1) and (a)(2). 14 The court of appeals distin-
guished between work-separation of spouses (as in this case) and marital
separation when the spouses have decided to dissolve their marriage.
The court analogized the work-separation situation to that of a couple
when one is assigned elsewhere by military responsibility.' 5 The court
added that "[als long as the parties choose to maintain a marriage, there
will be a marital residence somewhere."'1 6 There was evidence that the
husband in this case intended to maintain his marriage while his family
was living in Texas.17 Hence the court found that the marital residence
was in Texas for the purpose of divorce jurisdiction.' 8 The appellate
court concluded that for federal due-process purposes, there were suffi-
cient minimum contacts between the husband and Texas to subject him to
the specific jurisdiction of the court.' 9 The court also held that, despite
the geographical distance involved, in this instance when the respondent's
employer was willing to pay for his visits to Texas, that state's exercise of
personal jurisdiction over him was reasonable and fair. Under the cir-
cumstances, a great financial burden would be placed on the wife if she
were required to respond to pleadings in the New Zealand court.20
14. Id. at 74-75. See TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 6.305(a)(1)-(2) (Vernon 1998).
15. Goodenbour, 64 S.W.3d at 76-77. In Torrington Co. v. Stutzman, 46 S.W.3d 829,
849 n.17 (Tex. 2000), the court noted that military assignment does not establish a new
domicile for a service-person for conflict of laws purposes.
16. Goodenbour, 64 S.W.3d at 77.
17. Id.
18. Id. at 78.
19. Id. at 81 (distinguishing Dawson-Austin v. Austin, 968 S.W.2d 319, 321, 326 (Tex.
1998), where the contacts of the petitioner with Texas were based on the husband's unilat-
eral acts, and thus the Texas court did not have personal jurisdiction over the nonresident
respondent).
20. Goodenbour, 64 S.W.3d at 81.
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E. GROUNDS FOR DIVORCE
1. Cruelty
In Henry v. Henry21 a petitioner relied solely on the ground of cruelty22
for divorce. The motive for such reliance at a time when most petitioners
for divorce rely solely on insupportability23 is often attributable to a strat-
egy designed to influence the trial court toward a favorable division of
property for the petitioner. In Henry, however, it seems to have been
argued on behalf of the respondent that the ground of cruelty had been
superceded by the ground of insupportability. This argument was firmly
rejected. At the time that the no-fault ground of insupportablility was
proposed and enacted, it was understood that all other grounds provided
in the code maintained their prior force. 24 In Henry the appellate court
held that the trial court had reasonably concluded that the facts were
sufficient to support the petitioner's allegation of cruelty. 25
2. Insupportability
Assuming a generally faith-oriented position, the husband (as the re-
spondent-appellant) in Waite v. Waite26 mounted a broad constitutional
attack on his wife's petition for divorce on the ground of insup-
portability.27 He argued that the ground not only violates the Free Exer-
cise and Establishment 28 clauses of the United States Constitution but
also the Rights of Conscience, 29 Rights to Open Courts,30 and Rights of
Privacy 31 provisions of the Texas Constitution. With respect to the last of
these the appellate court held that the case was not ripe for determina-
tion.32 As to the appellant's other arguments, the entire court rejected
the husband's reliance on the federal Constitution and the Open Courts
provision of the Texas Constitution, but the justices differed with respect
to the Rights of Conscience provision of the Texas Constitution. A ma-
jority of the court rejected the appellant's argument in this respect, with a
dissent on the part of Justice Frost. There was agreement, however, that
most of the constitutional arguments did not support the husband's posi-
tion because the divorce statutes' secular foundations are sound in light
of the essentially secular orientation of the constitutional provisions.
21. 48 S.W.3d 468 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2001, no pet.)
22. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 6.002 (Vernon 1998).
23. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 6.001 (Vernon 1998).
24. See Joseph W. McKnight, Commentary to the Family Code, Title 1, Husband and
Wife, 13 TEX. TECH L. REV. 675, 677 (1982).
25. Henry, 48 S.W.3d at 468.
26. 64 S.W.3d 217 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2001, no pet.).
27. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 6.001 (Vernon 1998).
28. U.S. CONST. amend. 1.
29. TEX. CONST. art. I, § 6.
30. TEX. CONST. art. I, § 13.
31. TEX. CONST. art. I, § 9.
32. Waite, 64 S.W.3d at 223-24.
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II. CHARACTERIZATION OF MARITAL PROPERTY
A. PREMARITAL AND MARITAL PARTITIONS
1. Premarital Partition
Before approaching a negotiation leading to a premarital or a marital
partition, one should be well appraised of the problems associated with
such partitions. Open questions should be carefully studied by reference
to available literature, both with respect to Texas law and that prevailing
elsewhere, where one or both parties might live in the future.33 The de-
gree to which retirement benefits can be waived in partition or exchange
agreements is not altogether clear.34
The premarital agreement in McClary v. Thompson35 provided that in-
come derived from several specific premarital assets of each party would
remain separate property. The court concluded that the parties, in their
premarital agreement, had meant to partition the future income referred
to in their agreement, and that effort was apparently successful as to
"profits, dividends, interest, and proceeds [of existing separate prop-
erty]. ''36 During the marriage the couple had disposed of all the items of
property mentioned in the agreement except the husband's interest in a
contributory retirement plan stemming from his employment. As to that
property the agreement merely referred to the husband's premarital in-
terest in "all benefits, dividends and earned and unearned proceeds in a
retirement program ' 37 established by the husband's employer. Before
trial of their divorce case, the parties agreed that each would be awarded
one-half of the portion of the retirement plan found by the court to be
community property.38 The trial court awarded all of the interest in the
contributory retirement plan to the husband and the wife appealed. The
33. See, e.g., Judith T. Younger, Antenuptial Agreements, 28 WM. MITCHELL L. REV.
697 (2001). 24 FAMILY ADVOCATE (no. 2, Winter 2002) is wholly devoted to these issues
and contains a very useful bibliography.
34. See Anne Pachciarek & Julie Laece, Can Prenups Waive Pension Benefits?, 24
FAMILY ADVOCATE 41 (No. 2, Fall 2001). But the waiver of certain post mortem home-
stead rights does not preclude the existence of a homestead for other purposes. PaineWeb-
ber Inc. v. Murray, 260 B.R. 815, 82526 (E.D. Tex. 2001) (correction of homestead claim in
bankruptcy).
35. 65 S.W.3d 829 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 2002, no pet.).
36. Id. at 838 (citing Dokmanovic v. Schwarz, 880 S.W.2d 272, 275 (Tex. App.-Hous-
ton [14th Dist.] 1994, no writ.)); Winger v. Pianka, 831 S.W.2d 853, 856 (Tex. App.-Austin
1992, no pet.). Thus, if the parties have entered into a premarital partition, a further mari-
tal partition (as some recommend) is unnecessary. Further, if the terms of a subsequent
marital partition seem to depart from those of the former, an agreement to arbitrate differ-
ences as provided by the premarital partition is controlling along with the terms of the
Texas Arbitration Act. Koch v. Koch, 27 S.W.3d 93 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 2000, no
pet.); TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 171.001 et seq. (Vernon Supp. 2002). But if
the husband and wife, among others, are partners and the wife joined the partnership as a
party in her petition for divorce, an arbitration clause (on which she did not seek to rely) in
the partnership agreement does not have any bearing on the wife's divorce proceeding.
Southwest Texas Pathology Assoc. v. Roosth, 27 S.W.3d 204, 209 (Tex. App.-San Antonio
2002, no pet.).
37. McClary, 65 S.W.3d at 837.
38. Id. at 832.
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appellate court properly rejected the husband's argument of total sepa-
rate ownership based on the inception of title doctrine.39 The aspects of
the plan in dispute were the husband's contributions and interest earned
thereon. The plain language of the agreement did not specifically deal
with these particular aspects of the retirement plan, and the premarital
agreement nowhere referred to anything more than separate property in-
terests at the time the agreement was made. There was "no mention of
salary, earnings, income or employment benefits. '40 Neither did the
agreement exclude the creation of community property nor state that fu-
ture salary would be separate rather than community property.41 The ap-
pellate court therefore concluded that the interests in issue were
community property.
2. Marital Partition
In Nesmith v. Berger42 the appellate court considered the validity of a
1992 marital partition and commented on its terms in a motion for re-
hearing. Prior to their marriage, the couple had engaged in extended ne-
gotiations over several months toward a premarital partition of property
to be acquired during marriage. Several draft-agreements were consid-
ered, but as the wedding day (May 16) approached, an agreement had not
been reached. The couple then agreed in writing that "[i]t is our inten-
tion to have a post-nuptial agreement completed by June 12th. '' 43 After
the wedding the husband insisted on reaching an agreement by the date
specified, and he stated on May 21 that they would not depart on their
honeymoon until the agreement was signed. The agreement was exe-
cuted later that day, though there was a conflict of evidence as to whether
the appendices were attached to it. Also, the wife asserted that her oath
(unnecessary in this instance) was irregularly appended to the writing.
Both spouses complied with the terms of the instrument for several
years thereafter. In her petition for divorce in 2000 the wife asserted that
the partition was invalid for lack of volition on her part in that she had
been coerced by her husband's threat not to go on their honeymoon un-
less she had signed it. In reviewing the trial court's conclusion that she
had not discharged her burden of proof, the appellate court agreed that
the trial court's conclusion should stand in light of the mutual desire of
the parties to protect their interests by entering into the agreement, their
long but unsuccessful efforts to reach a premarital agreement, their ex-
pressed intent to enter into such an agreement after the wedding cere-
mony, the husband's fixing a deadline for doing so, and the spouses'
compliance with the terms of their agreement to execute the partition by
39. Id. at 836.
40. Id. at 838.
41. Id.
42. 64 S.W.3d 110 (Tex. App.-Austin 2001, no pet.), prior opinion of June 29, 2001
withdrawn.




During the marriage a home was acquired by the husband with a pay-
ment from his separate funds and giving a community obligation for the
rest of the purchase price. The pre-marital partition provided that all ac-
quisitions of the acquiring spouses would be separate property with which
all indebtedness would be discharged. Despite the partition the wife as-
serted that these terms meant that this acquisition was community prop-
erty because the seller did not agree to look only to the husband's
separate property for payment of the purchase-money indebtedness, as is
ordinarily required to make credit-purchases separate property.45 Look-
ing to all the circumstances in which the debt had arisen, the trial court
had concluded that the community presumption as to the property ac-
quired on credit had not been overcome.4 6 But, in the acquisition of the
home on credit, only the husband had signed the note to the lender of the
purchase price (beyond the initial separate payment) and the wife joined
in the deed of trust "pro forma for the reason that the property described
herein is the sole and separate property of [the husband]. 47
During the marriage, the wife had "bought in" to the home with the
proceeds from the sale of her separate property premarital home in order
to escape capital gains taxes.48 The trial court had awarded the wife a
monetary sum in lieu of her interest in the home. The wife argued on
appeal that she was thereby deprived of her separate interest in the prop-
erty. The husband argued on appeal that this transaction would have
caused the home to become his and his wife's partnership asset. The ap-
pellate court, however, pointed out that he waived that argument by not
offering it at trial. The court went on to add that, even if the argument
had been made in the court below, the requirements of a partnership
would not have been met,4 9 notwithstanding that the court had said in its
earlier opinion that co-ownership of the property had been achieved by
the wife's "buying in" to the house. Because of the way in which the
matter had been pled and argued, the wife was barred from claiming any
more than she had been awarded by the trial court. 50
The court did not suggest that the parties' marital partition, by its par-
ticular terms, purported to deal with the problem of co-ownership of the
home which arose through the "buy-in" arrangement. Nor did the court
suggest that the couple could not have dealt with their uncertain objects
44. Id. at 115.
45. See Gleich v. Bongio, 612, 99 S.W.2d 881, 884 (Tex. 1937).
46. Nesmith, 64 S.W.3d at 117.
47. Id. at 117. At this point one might have thought that the husband would have
relied on the rule in Lindsay v. Clayman, 254 S.W.2d 277 (Tex. 1952), and Messer v. John-
son, 422 S.W.2d 908 (Tex. 1967).
48. Nesmith, 64 S.W.3d at 113.
49. Id. at 117 (citing TEX. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 6132B-2.03 (Vernon Supp. 2001)).
50. Id. at 119. The wife's assertion that the trial court's deduction from the monetary
award of a proportional amount of mortgage and tax payments was also excluded. Though
the appellate court pointed out that the wife could have argued entitlement as a cotenant
to and offset for her constructive ouster, she had failed to do so. Id.
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effectively by terms that might have been appropriately included in the
partition agreement. If such an eventuality is foreseen, its resolution
should be dealt with in the partition. In the court's view, such a situation
clearly could not be dealt with by mere inferences from the agreement.51
B. TRACING
The fundamental means of proving that a spouse's marital property is
separate property are (1) identification of the property as acquired when
the owner was single,52 (2) a showing that particular property was the
subject matter of a gift or recovery for personal loss not measured by
earning power,53 (3) proof that specific property was an inheritance, or
(4) an identification of the property as a mutation of property acquired
by one of those means. An application of the principle of tracing to the
contents of a brokerage account is illustrated by Tate v. Tate.54 The ac-
count had been held by the wife's father who had designated her as joint
tenant with a right of survivorship. Hence, on the father's death in 1991
the wife became sole owner of the account. She thereupon added her
husband's name to the account as a joint tenant with the right of survivor-
ship, and he signed a card confirming that status. At the trial for divorce,
the wife explained that her husband's name had been added to the ac-
count only as a means of giving him access to the account in case of her
incapacity and of providing for his succession to the account if she should
predecease him. The wife testified that she had not intended to make a
present gift of any of the account to her husband and there had been no
discussion between them concerning a gift. The account was later trans-
ferred to another broker. At the time of the trial the account had a value
that was depleted by half through the wife's withdrawals, some of which
were converted to travelers' checks still in the wife's possession. Only the
wife had made withdrawals from the account. After her father's death
only one deposit was made to the account, and that was made by the wife.
That deposit consisted of proceeds of a judgment recovered by the hus-
band, apparently his separate property, as it is stated that no community
property went into the account. The amount of that deposit is not re-
vealed nor was there any apparent evidence of a gift to the wife by her
receipt of the check from her husband. The trial court made no findings
of fact or conclusions of law other than making an "order confirming that
certain assets [including the account and the travelers' checks] were [the
wife's] separate property. '55 The dispute as to the character of the bro-
kerage account was thus before the El Paso Court of Appeals. The court,
51. This point is very apparent from the earlier (withdrawn) opinion of the court.
52. TEX. CONST. art. XVI, § 15; TEx. FAM. CODE ANN. § 3.001 (Vernon 1998).
53. Id. The additional means of showing that property was acquired as a replacement
for personal loss not measured by loss of earning power does not appear on the face of the
Constitution but is derived from a broad interpretation of its meaning in Graham v.
Franco, 488 S.W.2d 390 (Tex. 1972); TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 3.001(3).
54. 55 S.W.3d 1 (Tex. App.-El Paso 2000, no pet.).
55. Id. at 3.
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however, dodged the characterization issue by treating the dispute as fun-
damental of division of property and thus minimizing the need for re-
moval. The court concluded that the husband had first to show that the
trial court's division of the community estate (with which an item of the
wife's separate property may have been fortuitously included) constituted
an abuse of discretion.
The Texas Supreme Court's conclusion in Jacobs v. Jacobs56 is simply
stated: if there has been a significant mischaracterization of marital prop-
erty in a matter of divorce, an intermediate appellate court must remand
the case for redivision. Thus, when there has been some error in charac-
terization of property, the question of remand turns on what constitutes a
"significant" mischaracterization. Rather than treating characterization
as amounting to a preoccupation with trifles57 (which under the circum-
stances would probably not have unreasonably affected the division of
the large community estate) and in the absence of any findings as to the
court's bases for division, 58 the court tested the result in Tate as an exer-
cise of judicial discretion.59 The court acknowledged this as "one of the
tougher appellate propositions. '60 In response to the husband's argu-
ment that the wife had failed to trace the contents of the brokerage ac-
count to the assets she had inherited (and assuming that his argument had
merit), the court concluded that his position was unsound because he had
failed to show how any alleged mischaracterizaton caused the trial court
to abuse its discretion. "In short, he [had] wholly failed to conduct a
harm analysis."' 61 To determine the application of the law to facts of a
particular dispute, the court carefully described three instances of exer-
cise of judicial good judgment (sometimes called judicial discretion). The
court treated the second as describing the case at hand:
First, suppose Wife claims Blackacre is her separate property and
Husband claims the asset is community property. Second, suppose
the trial court characterizes it as community property and awards it
to Wife. On appeal, Wife must establish error; she must challenge
that the characterization is against the great weight and preponder-
ance of the evidence (a factual sufficiency complaint) or establish
that separate property status was established as a matter of law (a
legal sufficiency complaint). She must also establish that the charac-
terization error was harmful-that because of the mischaracteriza-
tion, the overall division of property constitutes an abuse of
discretion.
Now suppose that given the same fact pattern, the trial court charac-
terizes Blackacre as Wife's separate property and awards it to her.
56. 687 S.W.2d 731, 732-33 (Tex. 1985).
57. Tate, 55 S.W.3d at 7. (The printer is guilty of twice misspelling a key word of the
maxim de minimis non curat (ex.).)
58. Id. at 10.
59. Id. at 5-7 n.3 (relying on the same court's conclusion and explanation in Lindsey v.
Lindsey, 965 S.W.2d 589, 592 n.3 (Tex. App.-El Paso 1998, no pet.)).
60. Id. at 5.
61. Id. at 7. By the court's analysis it was concluded that "[t]he characterization error,
if any, represents 8.5 percent of the total estate." Id. at 10.
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This time, Husband appeals. He must first establish error by chal-
lenging the legal or factual sufficiency of the evidence to support the
separate property characterization. He must also conduct a harm
analysis-that because of the mischaracterization, the overall divi-
sion of property constitutes an abuse of discretion.
It is only in the third scenario that reversible error exists as a matter
of law. In this example, Wife claims Blackacre is separate property
and Husband claims it is community property. The trial court char-
acterizes it as community property and awards it to Husband. If
Wife can establish that Blackacre is her separate property, it is un-
necessary to show harm because divestiture of separate property is
reversible error. In this singular instance, there is no need to demon-
strate that the overall property division constitutes an abuse of
discretion.62
The court succinctly summarized its conclusions:
In the absence of an issue concerning divestiture, we can draw the
following conclusions. If property is mischaracterized and the mis-
characterization affects the just and right division of the community
estate, we must remand the entire community division. If the mis-
characterization has a de minimis effect on the division, then there
has been no showing of an abuse of discretion. It is only when the
court mistakenly characterizes property that is of such magnitude
that it materially affects the just and right division of the community
estate that reversible error is demonstrated. 63
In Tate the El Paso court did not comment on the Dallas appellate
court's solution of a somewhat similar fact situation involving manage-
ment of an account containing the wife's solely managed community
property in Brooks v. Sherry Lane National Bank.64 In Brooks the wife
had given her husband access to her bank account for reasons similar to
those relied on in Tate. In that instance, however, the husband had actu-
ally used the account (but only once) for the purposes intended. The
court concluded that the account was therefore subject to joint manage-
ment of the spouses. The two cases are clearly distinguishable on several
grounds, principally because, in Tate, the character of the property was
put in issue whereas, in Brooks, the issue was the management of it. In
Tate the court put aside the difficult tracing question in that divorce case
by merely considering the result of the judicial exercise of discretion in
making its division. In a death case or one involving a creditor's claim,
the characterization question would have to be precisely resolved.
62. Tate, 55 S.W.3d at 6-7 (citations omitted). "[M]ere mischaracterization of separate
property as community property does not require reversal; it is appellant's burden to prove
that any disparity in the division was caused by the mischaracterization of property and
that it was of such substantial proportions that it constituted an abuse of the trial court's
discretion." Id. "[M]ischaracterization of community property as separate property is not
reversible unless the mischaracterization had more than a de minimis effect on the just and
right division." Id. at 7.
63. Id. at 11 (citations omitted).
64. 788 S.W.2d 874, 877 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1990 no writ.). The case was evidently not
cited to the court in Tate and no mention is made of it by the court.
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In re Case65 involved different considerations. As a general proposi-
tion only clear and convincing evidence can rebut 66 the community pre-
sumption. With respect to gratuitous transfers between spouses, a gift is
presumed in several instances,67 but may be rebutted by contrary
proof-most commonly by a showing of contrary intent of the transferor.
In cases when one spouse merely takes title in the name of the other
spouse, and payment is made with community property or the purchase is
made with community credit, there is no presumption of gift. In that in-
stance the intent to make a gift must be proved. The legislature can, of
course, vary this presumption just as it required clear and convincing evi-
dence to rebut the general community presumption in 1987.68 Another
instance of such legislative action is Probate Code section 438,69 dealing
with the contents of a bank account or a certificate of deposit. The stat-
ute provides that the separate property so deposited by one spouse in the
names of both spouses does not lose its separate character during the
lifetime of both spouses whereas, by application of the ordinary presump-
tion, a gift of one-half the deposit to the other spouse. Only "clear and
convincing evidence of a different intent" will disprove the Probate
Code's presumption. 70 Thus, a proportional interest of separate and
community property would apply to purchases with those funds held in
the account. 71 The consequence of this result is illustrated in Case.72
There the husband bought a certificate of deposit with his separate prop-
erty and put title in the names of both spouses. Thus, the court said that
the entire interest in the certificate of deposit belonged to the husband.
In the court's view, the fact that the names on the certificate were those
of both spouses did not affect this conclusion. 73
When the court in Case described the spouses' "purchase" 74 of a home
with community and separate funds, it did not state whether both types of
funds were used initially so that a proportionate purchase would result 75
65. 28 S.W.3d 154 (Tex. App.-Texarkana 2001, no pet.).
66. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 3.003(b) (Vernon 1998).
67. If separate property of one spouse is used to pay for property to which title is
taken in the name of the other, there is a presumption of gift to the transferee-spouse.
Smith v. Strahan, 16 Tex. 314 (1856). If separate property of one spouse is transferred
gratuitously to the other spouse there is also a presumption of gift. Goldberg v. Zellner,
235 S.W. 870 (Tex. Comm'n App. 1921, judgm't adopted). Further, a gratuitous transfer of
community property to the other spouse raises a presumption of gift. Story v. Marshall, 24
Tex. 305 (1859). For a recent summary of the law of donative transfers to a spouse, see Bill
Dudley, Donor's Remorse: When a Gift Is not a Gift, 2001 STATE BAR [OF TEXAS FAMILY
LAW] SECITION REPORT 7 (No. 1, Sprint 2001). But rules applicable to married couples do
not necessarily apply to persons about to marry. See In re Loftis, 40 S.W.3d 160, 165 (Tex.
App.-Texarkana 2001, no pet.) (premarital discharge of premarital obligation of other
spouse).
68. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 3.003(b).
69. TEX. PROB. CODE ANN. § 438 (Vernon 1980).
70. Id. § 438(a).
71. See Duncan v. United States, 247 F.2d 845, 851-52 (5th Cir. 1957).
72. Case, 28 S.W.3d at 161.
73. Id. at 159.
74. Id. at 160-61.
75. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 3.006 (Vernon 2002); Love v. Robertson, 7 Tex. 6 (1851).
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or whether the separate funds were used to discharge a probable
purchase-money lien on the property which had been disposed of prior to
the dispute. The latter was apparently the fact, for the court's analysis of
the payment of separate funds as giving rise to a right of reimbursement 76
would otherwise be erroneous.
Although the statute of 195777 made it plain that a life insurance policy
constitutes an item of property, the character of term policies as marital
property has not been clear. In its analysis of Texas law, the Fifth Circuit
Court of Appeals reached the conclusion in 1995 that a term policy, like a
"whole life" policy, takes its character from the date of acquisition. 78 The
Corpus Christi appellate court agreed with this proposition three years
later in Camp v. Camp.79 In Barnett v. Barnett8 ° the Texas Supreme
Court seemed to be inclined to the same conclusion.8'
In distinguishing between separate and community estates in Beard v.
Beard8 2 the court dealt with a plethora of transactions dealing with ac-
counts containing both separate and community funds. In one instance8 3
the court applied the identical sum inference derived from McKinley v.
McKinley.8 4 An identical sum inference is a withdrawal of funds from a
mixed fund of separate and community property in the precise amount of
the community deposit. As in McKinley, the Beard court identified the
withdrawal as community property.
C. REIMBURSEMENT AND ECONOMIC CONTRIBUTION
1. Reimbursement
Although the point is dealt with in Beard85 in rather summary fashion,
the court's conclusion concerning the wife's claim for payment of her sep-
arate property to discharge a community debt to purchase a ring is of
some importance. The husband apparently testified that he had bought
the ring with $7,000 of his separate property. The wife alleged, however,
that she had paid over $4,000 of her separate property toward that
purchase, though by that time the husband had probably given the ring to
76. Case, 28 S.W.3d at 161 (co-ownership of property by separate and community es-
tates from the time of acquisition).
77. TEX. GOV'T CODE ANN. § 312.011(13) (Vernon 1998).
78. See Estate of Cavenaugh v. Comm'r, 51 F.3d 597, 601-04 (5th Cir. 1995).
79. 972 S.W.2d 906 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1998, no pet.).
80. 67 S.W.3d 107, 111 (Tex. 2001).
81. See infra Part IV.B.1 at the end.
82. 49 S.W.3d 40 (Tex. App.-Waco 2001, no pet.).
83. Id. at 61 (the deposit and withdrawal of $1,948.12).
84. 496 S.W.2d 540, 542 (Tex. 1973). See Joseph W. McKnight, Family Law: Husband
and Wife, 52 SMU L. REV. 1143, 1154-56 (1999). In addition to what is said there, it should
be added that, for reimbursement purposes, tracing requirements are met by a showing
that the property for which reimbursement is sought was used to benefit another estate.
There need not be further tracing to show that the property contributed is still in the other
estate. In Beard the husband had used separate funds to discharge a home improvement
loan for the benefits of community property. The court held that the husband had there-
fore discharged his burden of proof of benefit to the property. Beard, 49 S.W.3d at 56.
85. Beard, 49 S.W.3d at 56, 58.
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her. The court said that the wife's proof of that fact was immaterial be-
cause the ring was awarded to her in the judgment. The reimbursement
question presented has long gone unanswered. Another example of the
same sort of question arises when a husband buys a particular item of
property on community credit and, after using her separate property to
discharge the indebtedness, his wife as legatee of the property under the
husband's will claims reimbursement for her payment. The holding in
Beard supports a negative response to her claim.
With respect to the wife's claim for reimbursement for her separate
payment of closing costs for the community purchase of the family home,
in order to prove payment, she must show that her funds were still in the
account at the date of payment. If other purchases deemed separate had
already accounted for all separate purchases from the account, her claim
would fail.8 6 This conclusion is unexceptionable: The claimant cannot re-
cover twice. The court's reasoning is consistent with its disposition of the
claim of separate funds to purchase the ring.
Other issues in Beard involved claims for reimbursement when the
wife's separate estate was commingled with community property. Insofar
as the husband made withdrawals from the commingled accounts, they
should have been presumed to be community property under the actual
holding in Sibley v. Sibley87 because the husband is subject to a fiduciary
duty to preserve the wife's separate property and to withdraw the com-
munity property in which he has a one-half interest.88 With respect to
withdrawals by the wife from an account containing her separate property
and community property, the court relied on the inequitable bastard-de-
scendants of Sibley89 for the proposition that the wife's withdrawal should
also be presumed to have been community property. But surely if her
separate funds and community funds were subject to her care, she should
be deemed first to withdraw the funds which were wholly hers rather than
those in which her husband had a one-half interest. The court's conclu-
sion that community funds were withdrawn first and were, as a result,
depleted, leaving only her own separate funds, therefore, seems errone-
ous for tracing purposes. However, it should be noted that, if both
spouses act in concert to make a withdrawal of funds from a commingled
community account and a separate property fund of one (or both) of
them, a presumption of withdrawal of community funds seems reason-
able. In Beard90 the court reached this conclusion, but for the wrong rea-
sons, i.e. simplistic reliance on the bastard-Sibley line of cases, which are
contrary to all principles of equity.91 If one spouse expends the other
86. Id. at 60.
87. 286 S.W.2d 657, 659 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1955, writ dism'd w.o.j.). See Joseph
W. McKnight, supra note 84.
88. Id.
89. E.g., Smith v. Smith, 22 S.W.3d 140, 146-47 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2000,
no pet.), noted in Joseph W. McKnight, Family Law: Husband and Wife, 53 SMU L. REV.
995, 1006-07 (2000).
90. Beard, 49 S.W.3d at 58.
91. See authorities cited infra note 92.
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spouse's property and stands in a fiduciary position in doing so, reim-
bursement is due to the other spouse on fiduciary principles. 92 But if a
spouse expends his or her own property, or the community property, for
an alleged reimbursable purpose, recovery should depend on the nature
of the purpose.
In Beard93 the wife appealed the divorce court's rejection of her claim
for reimbursement of the community estate for payment on a secured
bank loan to her husband, and for payment on an unsecured loan to him
by his father and the father's partner. Both loans had been made to the
husband while single to procure purchase money for his investment in
income-producing rental property. The community estate had reduced
the husband's secured bank loan by $7,528. On the couple's federal in-
come tax returns, the couple had saved over $7,000 in taxes for their
losses on the rental property. Business income from the property had
amounted to over $41,000. On the basis of the equities involved, the ap-
pellate court affirmed the exercise of the trial court's good judgment in
making no community reimbursement. Under the 2001 statute 94 the
community estate would be entitled to recover the $7,528, the amount by
which the husband's separate property had benefited for reduction of the
secured debt. As for the losses suffered by the husband's separate prop-
erty, under the 2001 statute the husband's separate estate might claim
and recover over $7,000 as reimbursement for reduction of community
taxes. Though the community estate was entitled by operation of law to
the $41,000 in income, many courts have treated that sort of income as an
equitable offset against a community reimbursement claim. Section
3.407, with respect to offsetting claims, seems inapplicable to this
situation.
In Beard95 the trial court denied the community estate reimbursement
for the husband's waste of community funds for his immoral recreation
expended at strip clubs over several years. The wife's expert estimated
these expenditures as $12,000. The husband had responded in effect that
he did not enjoy more conventional types of recreation (such as golf, fish-
ing, and hunting) and that his wife had squandered $11,000 of community
funds (on furs and jewelry) and more community property on expensive
clothes and the appearance and cleanliness of her hair. The trial court's
judgment was affirmed, and under the 2001 statute 96 a similar conclusion
would be reached.
2. Economic Contribution
As a type of reimbursement, it is assumed that claims for economic
92. See McKnight, supra note 84, at 1156.
93. Beard, 49 S.W. 3d at 63.
94. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 3.403 (Vernon Supp. 2002).
95. Beard, 64 S.W.3d at 63-64.
96. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 3.408 (Vernon Supp. 2002).
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contribution provided in the 2001 legislation 97 are subject to the same
general rules as for reimbursement claims generally: that claims cannot
be enforced prior to the termination of the marriage although they may
already be tentatively fixed subject to prior repayment, and that no inter-
est is imposed on the advancement unless specifically provided by statute.
A contractual loan or advancement is not, of course, subject to restric-
tions of reimbursement, which operate in accordance with the terms of
the contract or along the lines of quantum meruit and quantum valebat.
As in the case of community reimbursement, it is provided in section
7.007(a)(1) 98 that community recoveries for economic contributions are
subject to a just and right division on divorce. 99 Section 7.007(b) provides
that "[i]n a decree of divorce or annulment, the court shall determine the
rights of both spouses in a claim for reimbursement ... and (2) order a
division of the claim for reimbursement if appropriate, in a manner that
the court considers just and right ... ." This provision presumably refers
to community reimbursement only, as the reference to "rights of both
spouses" indicates, and that reading of the section is consistent with the
correlative provisions of sections 3.402, and 3.404, and 7.007(a) with re-
spect to claims for economic contribution.
Section 3.401100 of 2001 Texas Family Code replaces the somewhat sim-
ilar section 3.401 of 1999 that dealt with "financial contribution." In its
modified form, the new concept applies only to discharging a lien-bur-
dened marital estate or for capital improvements on another marital es-
tate "other than by incurring debts." 10 1 As for liens fixed for "ordinary
maintenance and repair" and for "taxes, interest, or insurance," the rules
of economic contribution do not apply. 102 "Ordinary maintenance and
repair" presumably does not cover an expenditure such as replacing a
roof, a major repair of a swimming pool or sprinkler system, or in the
case of rural property, significant expenditures for fencing, clearing
brush, putting in a new well or irrigation system, or providing substantial
accommodations for hunters or fishermen. "Taxes" in this context pre-
sumably refers mainly to local ad valorem taxes, and "interest or insur-
ance" seems to refer to periodic payments involving loans and insurance
protection. But "taxes" might refer to a federal tax lien or interest
thereon, and insurance might refer to title insurance. It may be difficult
in some instances to fit a particular fact situation within the catalogue of
97. See TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. §§ 3.401-.404, 3.406-.410, 7.002. Despite the clarity of
the 2001 statutory scheme as compared to that of 1999, there are nonetheless some aspects
of the new scheme left undefined. Two extensive commentaries on the 2001 act mention a
number of uncertainties. See Warren Cole, Developing, Presenting and Defending Eco-
nomic Contribution and Reimbursement Claims, PROCEEDINGS OF THE TEXAS ACADEMY
OF FAMILY LAW SPECIALIsTs 32 (Feb. 8, 2002), and Jerry Frank Jones, Claims for Eco-
nomic Contributions: House Bill 1245, 39 [STATE BAR OF TEXAS] REAL ESTATE, PROBATE
& TRUST LAW REPORTER 72-75 (No. 4, July 2001).
98. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 7007(a)(1) (Vernon Supp. 2002).
99. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. §§ 3.402, 3.404, 7007(a) (Vernon Supp. 2002).
100. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 3.401 (Vernon 2001).




economic contributions in section 3.402.103 One is reminded of In re
Gill,10 4 where the Waco Court of Appeals held that the phrase "debt on
separate property," in the context of the 1999 version of section 3.402,105
meant "only debts of a spouse that are separate obligations of that
spouse's estate secured by that spouse's separate property"'0 6 for the pur-
pose of determining a community right of reimbursement for a "financial
contribution" in paying the debt. The court denied community reim-
bursement in that instance for the discharge of the lien fixed on the wife's
separate property for a loan to both spouses using the wife's separate
property as collateral. 10 7 The statutory language was thus interpreted to
refer only to a debt for which the creditor has agreed to look solely to a
borrowing spouse's separate property for payment. For purposes of an
economic contribution claim under the 2001 version of section 3.402,108
the court presumably would have reached the same conclusion. In light
of the rarity of instances in which a creditor agrees to limit recovery to a
borrower's separate property, the statute will probably be interpreted
very narrowly.
Section 3.402(b)(2) excludes recovery of an "economic contribution"
for a spouses's services expended for a separate marital estate, but such a
benefit seems compensable as a reimbursement under section 3.408.109
In section 3.409 (added in 2001) certain claims are also not compensable
as reimbursement. Such claims include "contributions of property of a
nominal [or trifling] amount," "payment of child support, alimony, or
spousal maintenance" (presumably under court order, contractual obliga-
tion, or some other enforceable duty), "living expenses of a spouse or
child of a spouse," and "a student loan owed by a spouse."' 10 Some of
these exclusions from reimbursement may dampen frivolous claims
though they cannot be excluded by the operation of equitable principles.
But these exclusions will achieve some uniformity of reimbursement
standards.
The approach of the Legislature to redefinition of the rules of reim-
bursement as defined in 1999 and 2001 is significantly different from its
approach to earlier major reform of family property law. The recent en-
actments, as seen from the vantage point of the end of the 2001 session,
seem analogous to a series of drafts, with each subsequent tentative en-
actment merely replacing and correcting what went before. This criticism
103. § 3.402 (Vernon Supp. 2002).
104. In re Marriage of Gill, 41 S.W.3d 255, 258 (Tex. App.-Waco 2001, no pet. filed).
105. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 3.402.
106. Gill, 41 S.W.3d at 258 n.3.
107. Id. at 259.
108. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 3.402.
109. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. §§ 3.402, 3.408. The hourly rate for such services, however,
should not exceed that of a person ordinarily competent in rendering the services per-
formed. That is, for hedge-clipping and rent collection for her husband's rental property
his lawyer's wife's services should not be charged at a lawyer's rate but at the rates charged
by hedge-clippers or rent collectors.
110. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 3.409 (Vernon 2001).
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is merely of legislative technique. Though one may disagree with the wis-
dom of some of the provisions, the legislation that emerged in 2001 was
carefully drafted and is generally clear in its meaning.
The drafters of the 2001 legislation were generally careful to define
economic contribution and to provide that the rules of reimbursement
would continue to deal with other interspousal claims."'I The rules gov-
erning financial contribution and reimbursement had already been de-
fined as somewhat different sorts of claims in 1999, but the details of the
new system were not well defined. Now the elements of the system are
far more clearly indicated. What is not an economic contribution com-
pensable by one marital estate to another may still be a right of reim-
bursement.112 As a general rule, however, claims for reimbursement will
usually be those for depletion of the community estate or the other
spouse's separate estate, as well as claims for betterment of property not
related to the discharge of secured liability.113
By statutory definition, an economic contribution reflects a betterment
of one marital estate by an advancement made by another marital es-
tate.114 If there is any unreasonably large withdrawal from the commu-
nity estate and no benefit to either separate estate, a right of
reimbursement as defined prior to the statute may be claimed.115 These
are rights previously defined as rights of reimbursement which are now
excluded from the definition of economic contribution in sections 3.402,
3.403, and 3.408(a). Apart from the category defined as an economic
contribution, there are the further provisions of section 3.402, which ex-
clude recovery for betterments of another marital estate but are not de-
fined as an economic contribution by section 3.402.116 A good example
of this sort of reimbursement for betterment is that which is not made in
favor of property subject to a secured interest. Those sorts of betterments
left undefined as economic contributions in section 3.402 are therefore
still subject to claims for reimbursement. Besides property burdened by a
secured interest as defined in sections 3.402(a)(1)-(6), a further striking
redefinition of interests achieved by these statutes are the effects of equi-
table considerations excluded by, or omitted from, section 3.403.117 How-
ever, such factors are still effective for claims of reimbursement. 18 The
new statute (as built on the foundation of the old concept of reimburse-
ment) specifically provides that recovery for economic contributions
arise, not only when a marriage is dissolved by divorce or annulment, 1 9
but also when a marriage is dissolved by death.' 20












III. EXEMPTIONS OF MARITAL PROPERTY
FROM LIABILITY
A. NATURE AND EXTENT OF HOMESTEAD PROPERTY
1. Rural Homestead
The distinction between the urban and rural homestead is fundamental
to Texas law. The Legislature may allow up to ten acres for an urban
homestead and up to two hundred acres for a rural homestead. 2 1 In
both instances the Legislature has allowed the maximum acreage for
those purposes, except that a single claimant nor a part of a family is not
entitled to more than one hundred rural acres. 122
In 1989, the provisions of the Property Code section 41.002123 were
amended to protect rural landowners from an encroaching municipality
and its ad valorem taxation of otherwise rural realty. 124 The statute pro-
vided that such rural land did not become urban for homestead purposes
unless certain municipal services were extended to the property. 12 5 The
provision was construed to mean that even if such municipal services
were provided, the land that was otherwise a rural homestead did not lose
its rural character.126 In 1999 municipal taxing authorities and lenders,
wishing more certainty for the non-homestead character of realty that
might be subject to municipal taxation or that might serve as security for
a loan, achieved a statutory amendment 127 providing that such land be-
comes an urban homestead if located within municipal boundaries "or its
extraterritorial jurisdiction or a platted subdivision" and if it is served
with certain more broadly defined municipal amenities. 128 Thus, the real-
ity of a rural location as a standard for determining rural homestead char-
acter of such land was even further diminished.
In In re Perry129 a debtor filed for in bankruptcy in 2000 and claimed
about twenty-six acres where his mobile home and (apparently) his home
were located, and five acres adjoining it further into the country, and an
adjoining fifty-nine acres. All ninety acres were claimed as exempt prop-
erty. 130 The court explained that the first step in determining the rural or
urban character of homestead property is application of section
41.002(c). 13 1 If the property is found to be within urban boundaries, the
121. TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. § 41.002 (Vernon 2000).
122. Id.
123. 1989 TEX. LAws 1517, ch. 391, § 2 at 1519.
124. In re Perry, 267 B.R. 759 (Bankr. W.D. Tex. 2001).
125. TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. § 41.002(c) (Vernon 2000).
126. See Joseph W. McKnight, Family Law: Husband and Wife, 53 SMU L. REV. 995,
1026 (2000), Joseph W. McKnight, Family Law: Husband and Wife, 46 SMU L. REV. 1475,
1494 (1993).
127. PROP. CODE ANN. § 41.002 (c) (West 2000).
128. Id.
129. 267 B.R. 759 (Bankr. W.D. Tex. 2001).
130. Id. at 762.
131. Id. at 766; PROP. CODE ANN. § 41.002(c).
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court must then consider the relationship of the site to a municipality. 132
If both of these tests for an urban location are met, the property is ur-
ban. 133 If either test is not satisfied, the property is deemed rural. 134 In
this instance the entire area was claimed as rural. 135 But as to the mobile-
home park, the court found that those acres could not be characterized as
a rural homestead because the debtor used them "for business pur-
poses,' 1 36 seemingly identifying any business purpose as making the area
non-rural. The result may be usefully compared to that in Hollifield v.
Hilton,'1 37 in which the construction of a mobile-home park on rural acre-
age was said to constitute a lien on the rural homestead, including the
debtor's adjacent home.138 In Hollifield, the court started with an ac-
knowledgment of a rural homestead of long occupation, within which a
mobile-home park was later constructed, 139 an approach not fundamen-
tally different from that of the court in Perry. The court then went on to
consider the validity of the lien for an improvement of the rural property
without any analysis of its later use.140 There the court was concerned
principally with the validity of the lien and its extent and stated that the
lien supporting the loan for an improvement would have been valid on
the land underlying the improvement even whether or not the property
had character when the improvement lien allegedly arose. The court con-
cluded that the lien extended to the site of the family home, thus treating
the subject matter of the lien as an improvement on the entire rural
homestead.' 4 ' There was no suggestion, however, that business use of a
commercial character thereby made the land urban.
A situation in Perry may also be usefully compared to that In re Mitch-
ell,' 42 where the issue was the extent of a rural homestead as defined by
its non-use rather than its use. There the use of the rural homestead had
132. Id. The court enumerates five factors: "(1) the location of the land with respect to
the limits of the municipality; (2) the situs of the lot in question; (3) the existence of munic-
ipal utilities and services; (4) the use of the lot and adjacent property; and (5) the presence
of the platted streets, blocks, and the like..." (quoting U.S. v. Blakeman, 997 F.2d 1084,
1091 (5th Cir. 1992).
133. Perry, 267 B.R. at 767.
134. Perry, 267 B.R. at 767.
135. Id.
136. Id. at 768, 770 (citing In re Bradley, 960 F.2d 502 (5th Cir. 1992, cert. denied sub
nom.) Commonwealth Land Title Ins. Co. v. Bradley, 507 U.S. 971 (1993): "the operation
of a business on part of a rural homestead forfeits the homestead on that part of the prop-
erty." Id. at 506 n.6.
137. 515 S.W.2d 717 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1974, writ ref'd n.r.e.); compare Au-
try v. Reasor, 108 S.W. 1162, rev'd on hearing by 113 S.W. 748 (Tex. 1908). There the Texas
Supreme Court said in relation to a rural homestead that farming on shares does not allow
inclusion of property (so used) as part of a rural homestead even though the profits there-
from may be used for the benefit of the family. In that instance, however, the court was
considering later acquisitions of non-contiguous rural land classified as an expansion of the
already existing rural homestead.
138. The debtor seems to have lived on the 26 acres.
139. Id. at 719.
140. Id. at 720-21.
141. Id. at 721. See Joseph W. McKnight, Family Law: Husband and Wife, 29 Sw. L. J.
67, 94 (1975).
142. 132 B.R. 553 (Bankr. W.D. Tex. 1991).
1054 [Vol. 55
HUSBAND AND WIFE
deteriorated from farming and ranching for the support of the family to
no agricultural or commercial use at all-except for the psychic support
supplied to the family by the surrounding scenery. 143 In a general sense
the court departed from the holding in In re Spencer144 to conclude that
the rural homestead was maintained to its full extent. In In re McCain145
the court followed Mitchell. Hence, in both instances, the use of rural
land as a home sufficed to fix a homestead character on the entire acre-
age allowed regardless of use. 146 Thus for over a century judicial inter-
pretation of the definition of a rural homestead has departed significantly
from the single requirement of agricultural use of rural land for the fam-
ily's direct benefit as enunciated in Autry v. Reasor.
2. Urban Homestead
The court in In re Webb 147 considered what used to be thought of as an
even more elementary application of homestead law. 148 There a debtor
in bankruptcy claimed three rural rent-houses located on separate parcels
of land near his rural homestead. 149 The Bankruptcy Court denied inclu-
sion of those improved lots in the debtor's rural homestead. 150 Gathering
rents, treated as a decisive non-homestead use in a rural setting, also has a
non-homestead use in an urban context. 151 But is this still so as to the
urban rental property contiguous to the family home and within the al-
lowed dimensions of an urban homestead 152 if the "business" of the
homestead claimant is that of renting realty?
In Blum v. Roger, the Texas Supreme Court held in 1890 that a lien put
on urban property for the improvement of a segregated portion of the
property will fix only that segregated part used for the non-homestead
purpose-in that instance an adjacent rent house. 153 Now that conclusion
may be altered. In Perry the court observed that "[r]enting activity is
generally classified as investment activity rather than a business or call-
ing, because it requires little time and attention and does not comport to
the generally accepted notions of business. 1 54 In Autry the Supreme
Court of Texas said, in relation to a rural homestead, that farming on
143. Id. at 556-57, cited by the court in In re Perry, 267 B.R. at 765 n.6.
144. 109 B.R. 715, 718 (Bankr. W.D. Tex. 1989).
145. 160 B.R. 933, 938 (Bankr. E.D. Tex. 1993).
146. Mitchell, 132 B.R. at 568.
147. 263 B.R. 788 (Bankr. W.D. Tex. 2001).
148. Cf PaineWebber Inc. v. Murray, 260 B.R. 815, 830-31 (E.D. Tex. 2001), where
some of these issues are further discussed.
149. Webb, 263 B.R. at 790.
150. Id. at 796.
151. Id. at 795-96.
152. TEX. CONST. art. XVI, § 50 (as amended 1999).
153. 15 S.W. 115 (Tex. 1890). In Atwood v. Guaranty Construction Co., 63 S.W.2d 685
(Tex. Comm'n App. 1933, judgment accepted), the Commission of Appeals held that a lien
for construction of two rent-houses on a segregated portion of urban homestead property
cannot impose an incumbrance on the family home. But see Rancho Oil Co. v. Powell, 175
S.W.2d 960 (Tex. 1943); Sayers v. Pyland, 161 S.W.2d 769 (Tex. 1942).
154. Perry, 267 B.R. at 769 (citing C.D. Shamburger Lumber Co. v. Delavan, 106
S.W.2d 351, 357 (Tex. Civ. App.- Amarillo 1937, writ. ref'd.)).
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shares (a common rental arrangement at that time) does not allow inclu-
sion of property so used as part of a rural homestead, even though the
profits may be used for the benefit of the family.1 55 In light of shifts of
public attitudes toward land use, the homestead provisions of the Texas
Constitution may require, not only general simplication, but also some
considerable rethinking in relation to economic changes that have oc-
curred over the last century and a half.
The Texas Attorney General reached an anomalous result in the inter-
pretation of the Tax Code section 11.13(h) 156 regarding homesteads. 57
Although a temporary renting of the entire homestead to another does
not cause the homestead claimant to lose the homestead exemption for
ad valorem tax purposes, a renting of only a portion of a residential
homestead to another while the homestead claimant occupies the rest
does cause the loss of the homestead tax exemption for the proportional
part of the homestead so rented. 58 The latter conclusion is inconsistent
for exemption purposes with a bankruptcy court's determination in In re
Root159 that an entire urban lot is exempt when the debtor constructs a
duplex there and occupies only one side of the duplex.
B. EQUITABLE ELECTION AS AFFECTING HOMESTEAD RIGHTS
The principal decision of the Texas Supreme Court defining the doc-
trine of equitable election in relation to homestead rights is Miller v.
Miller, 60 and as so often occurs in equitable election disputes, the prob-
lem arose there accidentally. There, the husband-father will devised the
family home to his wife and daughter to "share and share alike" and
made other provisions for his widow. 16 1 Thus, he had deprived the widow
of her rights of sole occupancy of the homestead by granting the daughter
a testamentary right of co-occupancy. The decedent had, however, made
other provisions in his will for his widow to take certain property rights to
which she was not otherwise entitled. This provision constituted a con-
flicting detriment and hence a conditional benefit. The widow was there-
fore put to an equitable election between the sole occupancy of the
homestead and the other benefits given to her under the will.' 62 In Gar-
ner v. Estate of Long 63 the wife's will described the family home as her
separate property but gave her husband a life estate in it. He was also
bequeathed certain personal property of the decedent in which he pre-
sumably held no prior interest. 64 The widowed husband brought suit
155. Autry, 108 S.W. at 1164.
156. TEX. TAX COE ANN. § 11.13(h) (Vernon 1997).
157. Tex. Att'y Gen. Op. JC-0415 (2001).
158. See id.
159. No. 281-00035 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. June 29, 1981, commented on in Joseph W. M .
Knight, Family Law, Husband and Wife, 36 Sw. L.J. 97, 123 (1982).
160. 235 S.W.2d 624 (Tex. 1951).
161. Id. at 546, 625.
162. Id. at 550, 628.
163. 49 S.W.3d 920 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 2001, no pet.).
164. Id. at 921-22.
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against his late wife's independent executor for a declaration that the
family home was the community estate of him and his deceased wife and
a determination of his homestead rights.165 The husband's independent
executor was substituted for the widower after his death before the trial.
It was stipulated by both parties, however, that the home had been the
community estate of the spouses, and that its contrary characterization
had not been affected by the decedent's will.166 The parties further stipu-
lated that the will had not put the widower to an election. 167 However,
the problem of the widower's election had been resolved by the prior
stipulation, and there was therefore no dispute to adjudicate. A decision
of the Probate Court of Tarrant County, which was nonetheless in favor
of the husband's executor, was affirmed by the Fort Worth Court of Ap-
peals.168 The court had been merely called upon to approve a settlement
between independent executors to which they had apparent full power to
agree.
One of the first rules in applying the principle of equitable election is
that there should be no election if the will can be construed so that a need
for an election is avoided. 169 The wife's executor seems to have appealed
merely to attach the imprimatur of the appellate court to the settlement
in the interest of extraneous considerations. The arguments of the parties
were thus presented in an adversary fashion. The appellant argued that
the widower had already been put to an election and that he was there-
fore estopped from making any further contest because he had already
accepted benefits under the will.' 70 His executor argued in turn that the
wife's will had not put her husband to an election. 171 The appellate court
concluded that, because a surviving spouse has a right of occupancy in the
family home for life, regardless of receiving a life estate by the will, the
wife's characterization of the property as her separate estate was
irrelevant.1 72
The surviving spouse's right of occupancy of the homestead resembles
a life estate in fee, but the two rights are not coextensive. For example,
the widower might convey his fee interest for life to another as an estate
pur autre vie, but by being out of possession of his mere homestead right
of occupancy for an unreasonably long time, he would cause the home-
stead right (and hence the right to rent the property) to be lost during the
widower's lifetime. Further, the husband with a life estate could give up
that estate in what the wife termed her separate property and still main-
tain his constitutional homestead right of sole occupancy. But his taking
a life estate in the deceased wife's share of community property did not
165. Id. at 922.
166. Id.
167. Id.
168. Garner, 49 s.W.3d at 923.
169. See Wright v. Wright, 274 S.W.2d 670 (Tex. 1955).





conflict with receipt of other items of the widow's separate or community
property interest. But if no agreement as to the marital character of the
property had been reached, and the husband had knowingly made the
choice to take a life estate to the entire homestead as described in the
will, he would have made an election between that right in her separate
property as well as other bequests of her separate property and his com-
munity interest in the home. In all likelihood the outcome was not pro-
duced by a very serious dispute. But if the residuary takers under the
wife's will and the takers under the husband's will were different or took
different shares, and if the husband had not asserted any community
claim to the homestead, he could have enjoyed all the benefits of his
wife's separate property and a life-estate in all of the home under her
will. But the remainder interest in the home after the husband's life es-
tate would have passed to the wife's devisees. On the other hand, if the
husband had elected his community rights to the home, as well as his
constitutional right of occupancy of the entire property for life, he would
have lost his entire testamentary interest in the rest of his wife's property
apart from his right of homestead occupancy of the home. His share of
the community home, however, would have been excluded from her es-
tate. If the husband had been merely left to enjoy his right of homestead
occupancy but his wife had devised the entirety of the home to someone
else, he could have rented out her half of the property (as well as his
own) only temporarily during his lifetime.
C. HOME-EQUITY LOANS 173
In Doody v. Amirquest Mortgage Co. 174 it was asserted that an over-
charge of closing costs in violation of the constitutional limit of three per-
cent 175 vitiated a home-equity lien even though the over-charge was
refunded within a reasonable time of making the charge. The Texas Su-
preme Court concluded that the further constitutional provision prevent-
ing forfeiture of principal and interest applicable to all obligations of the
lender validated the lien if the lender (or a subsequent holder of a prom-
issory note) complied with its obligations within a reasonable time after
closing the transaction.176
D. LIENS ON HOMESTEADS
There are several longstanding myths generated by realtors and banks
with respect to our community property system. One of these is that all
conveyances of homes must be made to both spouses and that both
173. See Julia Patterson Forrester, Home Equity Loans in Texas: Maintaining the Texas
Tradition of Homestead Protection, 55 SMU L. REV. 157 (2002); [Texas] Office of
Consumer Credit, Home Equity Lending: Common Questions and Answers for Texans,
from which some of its contents are extracted in Home Equity Loans: Common Questions
and Answers, 65 TEX. B. J. 381 (April 2002).
174. 49 S.W.3d 342 (Tex. 2001).
175. TEX. CONsT. art. XVI, § 50(a)(1).
176. Doody, 49 S.W.3d at 347.
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spouses must join in borrowing money whether it is for the purpose of
buying a homestead or not. Of course the lender may not be willing to
lend money on any other terms, but that is merely the lender's law, not
the law of Texas. From time to time the real laws in these matters need
restatement. Skelton v. Washington Mutual Bank t 77 dealt with the first of
these myths. In 1995 a husband and wife agreed that only the husband
would negotiate a loan to buy a house because of the wife's poor credit
history. The husband represented himself as a single man on the loan
application. After receiving the loan, the sale was closed and payments
were made on the note with both spouses' earnings. Due to the hus-
band's illness the couple fell behind in their payments and about a year
later the husband died. After his death the mortgagee undertook to fore-
close its deed of trust lien, and the widow moved for a declaratory judg-
ment concerning her homestead and community property claims. The
mortgagee responded with a countermotion concerning the validity of its
lien and its motion was granted. In her appeal the widow asserted that
her homestead rights were superior to the mortgagee's right to foreclose.
The Amarillo Court of Appeals sustained the trial court's judgment in
favor of the mortgagee, pointing out that the homestead lien and the
homestead interest were created simultaneously, 178 though actual occu-
pancy occurred somewhat thereafter. If the couple had already begun
their move into the house or had completed the move prior to the closing,
there is room for argument that because the husband had an enforceable
equitable contract to purchase the home, the wife's joinder in creating the
lien was necessary. But she did not join and that argument was not later
made. As to the wife's argument that community property rights were
somehow superior the rights of the mortgagee, the court concluded that
because those rights were based on the warranty deed's reservation of a
vendor's lien, a party (if the widow were a party) cannot claim benefits
under an instrument without confirming its validity and accepting its bur-
dens.179 It is, however, an erroneous stretch of concepts to say in this
instance that because the property was a community acquisition for which
there was also community liability, the widow became a party to the con-
tract. As to her husband's representation that he was single (to which she
agreed though she may have been unaware of the representation itself)
the court said that there was no fact question which would bar the mort-
gagee's right to summary judgment because the issue of the husband's
bona fides as purchaser was irrelevant to the widow's homestead and
community property claims. 180 The court also attached some sort of es-
toppel to the widow's alleged concealment of her interest in the property
177. 61 S.W.3d 56 (Tex. App.-Amarillo 2001, no pet.).
178. Id. at 60. Whether a lien on a homestead is fixed on particular property is subject
to dispute. See CVN Group, Inc. v. Delgado, 47 S.W.3d 157 (Tex. App.-Austin 2001, no
pet.). See also Chase Manhattan Bank v. Bowles, 52 S.W.3d 871 (Tex. App.-Waco 2001).




when purchased t8t but that observation (if true) also seems irrelevant.
Maintenance of homestead character of property despite deterioration
of homestead use is clearly different in consequence from an assertion of
change of homestead. The consequences of a change in an ex-husband's
bankruptcy proceeding was examined in In re Dawson.l8 2 During much
of the marriage the couple had made their home in the wife's separate
property. During the marriage the husband had acquired an apartment
building as community property; when the couple separated the husband
moved to that building where he was still living when the wife filed her
petition for divorce and when he filed his petition in bankruptcy a short
time afterward.
The divorce court divided the parties' community property equally be-
tween them and ordered sale of the apartment building to facilitate divi-
sion. As the bankruptcy proceeding was still pending, the ex-husband (by
that time) amended his schedule to claim the apartment building as his
homestead. His ex-wife objected to that designation and insisted that his
homestead continued to be at her residence as the family home during
the marriage when he filed his bankruptcy petition. In favor of the ex-
wife's position the bankruptcy court stressed the bankruptcy rule that a
homestead for the purpose of exemption is determined as of the time the
petition in bankruptcy is filed. The Bankruptcy Court also relied on the
Texas Constitution article, XVI, section 50(b) 183 providing that neither
spouse can unilaterally abandon or change the homestead without the
consent of the other spouse. The purpose of that provision, however, is
principally to prohibit unilateral abandonment to affect the homestead
claim of the other spouse in the family home. The United States Supreme
Court's application of Texas law in United States v. Rodgers184 illustrates
that implication of the Constitution in favor of continuity of the home-
stead after the death of a spouse when the homestead is the decedent's
separate property. It has been long understood, however, that one
spouse may voluntarily abdicate his or her own homestead claim by aban-
doning the other spouse who continues to reside in the homestead, 85 and
an ex-spouse living alone outside the marital homestead may establish
another homestead for the purposes of maintaining a home for the visits
of a mutual minor child.186 The most telling argument that might have
been relied on by the ex-wife is simply that a co-owner husband could not
181. Id.
182. 266 B.R. 355 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 2001). The homestead is protected from seizure
and sale from the moment that a bankruptcy petition is filed, even if minutes after the
filing, a foreclosure sale is conducted. In re Pierce, 272 B.R. 198 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. 2001).
183. TEX. CONsT. art. XVI, § 50(b) (amended 1999).
184. 461 U.S. 677, 685 (1983).
185. Earle's Ex'rs v. Earle, 9 Tex. 630 (1853).
186. Renaldo v. Bank of San Antonio, 630 S.W.2d 638 (Tex. 1982). See Joseph W. Mc
Knight, Family Law: Husband and Wife, 38 Sw. L.J.131, 150 (1984) (as to whether the
claim might be made by a single person after divorce); Joseph W. McKnight, Family Law:
Husband and Wife, 37 Sw. L.J. 65, 82-83 (1983). It was not until 1973 that a single person
could claim an independent homestead except as head of a family.
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successfully assert a homestead claim without the consent of another co-
owner of the community apartment building. In that instance either
spouse is entitled to a partition, 187 and sale and division of the proceeds
may be the only practicable means of achieving a partition, as in this case.
Though the debtor in Dawson was satisfied with an exempt one-half
interest in the proceeds of his community residence as divided by the
divorce court, 188 in In re Zibman189 a debtor-couple sought an exemption
for the full amount of the sales price for their Texas home which they had
not reinvested in a new homestead. They succeeded before a bankruptcy
court and a federal district court but failed in the trustee's appeal to the
Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit. The debtors had filed for bank-
ruptcy within six months of sale of their homestead and claimed the pro-
ceeds as exempt property within Property Code section 41.001(c), 190
which provides that the proceeds of sale of a homestead are exempt for
six months. After six months had elapsed and the debtors had not rein-
vested the sales-proceeds in a new homestead and had moved from the
state, the trustee in bankruptcy filed an objection to the exemption
claimed. The Bankruptcy Court had reasoned that because the debtors
were entitled to the sale proceeds still on hand at the date of filing their
petition, that amount was fully exempt for bankruptcy purposes,' 9' re-
gardless of the fact that the couple testified that they did not intend to
reinvest the funds in another Texas homestead. 192 Adopting the trustee's
argument that the reinvestment aspect of the Texas homestead exemption
is integral to the exemption process and is not interrupted by a filing for
bankruptcy by the claimants, 193 the Fifth Circuit court concluded that
"the 6-month limitation is inextricably intertwined with the exemption
the state has chosen to provide to proceeds from the sale of the home-
stead .... [This] decision... conforms with the objective of ... Texas's
exemption for proceeds from the sale of a homestead.... [T]he object of
the proceeds exemption statute was solely to allow the claimant to invest
the proceeds in another homestead, not to protect the proceeds, in and of
themselves.' 94 It might have been added that in In re Evans'95 a bank-
ruptcy court had held that if only a part of the proceeds of sale of a home-
stead is invested in a new homestead for the debtor, the rest of the
proceeds are not exempt in bankruptcy.
187. But a prior court's order may bar such a partition. See First Huntsville Properties
Co. v. Laster, 797 S.W.2d 151 (Tex. App.-Houston 1990) (giving one former co-owner
spouse sole occupancy before a partition is sought after the other co-owner's assignment),
affd 826 S.W.2d 125 (Tex. 1991). See Joseph W. MCKnight, Family Law: Husband and
Wife, 45 SMU L. REV. 1831, 1848-48 (1992).
188. Dawson, 266 B.R. at 357.
189. 268 F.3d 298 (5th Cir. 2001).
190. TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. § 41.001(c) (Vernon 2001).
191. Zibman, 268 F.3d at 303.
192. Id. at 305 n.29.
193. Id. at 301.
194. Id. at 304 (quoting In re England, 975 F.2d 1168, 1174-75 (5th Cir. 1992) (second
emphasis added by the court)).
195. 135 B.R. 261, 264 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. 1991).
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In another case involving notice, 196 a widow and her late husband had
given a purchase money lien on acquiring the family home. After fore-
closure of the lien the widow and children brought suit to set aside a
foreclosure sale for gross inadequacy of price, 97 and as a necessary irreg-
ularity in the sale they alleged failure to give proper written notice to the
family members as heirs of the deceased husband-father. Property Code
section 51.002(d) 98 requires that when foreclosure on residential realty is
sought against the resident debtor, there must be notice to cure the de-
fault in payment, apart from the general notice of foreclosure provided
for in section 51.002(b). 199 The gross inadequacy of price, coupled with
failure to give notice to the resident-plaintiffs, was sufficient to set aside
the foreclosure sale. 200
In Jones v. Bank United of Texas201 as part of a property settlement
agreement the wife, soon to be divorced, was granted a vendor's lien on
the marital home,202 though there was a prior lien on the home that gave
notice of foreclosure to the lender of the purchase-price. In this instance
the prior lien-holder failed to give notice of foreclosure to the ex-wife, as
she soon became. The court held that the ex-wife was not entitled to
further notice because the recorded prior lien gave her notice of possible
foreclosure by the prior lienholder.20 3 As a result of the ex-wife's junior-
lien position, she could not be satisfied from the proceeds of the first
mortgagee's sale.
When called upon to interpret section 62.003 of the Property Code, 204
the Attorney General concluded that the language stating that a personal
property lien on a "manufactured [mobile] home" fixes a lien on realty to
which the home is attached.20 5 The opinion pointed out, however, that
article XVI, section 50 of the Texas Constitution, which deals specifically
with homesteads, provides that a purchase money "debt" fixes a lien on
"land" and "improvements thereon" but does not permit a purchase
money debt for the acquisition of personalty there on to become a lien
for the acquisition of land.20 6 Further, it was the attorney general's opin-
ion that "a purchase money lien against the homestead is valid only to the
extent of the ... purchase money debts used to acquire the property. '20 7
A lien on a manufactured home permanently attached to homestead re-
alty as an improvement nevertheless continues to be valid against the
196. Mills v. Haggard, 58 S.W.3d 164 (Tex. App.-Waco 2001, no pet.).
197. The foreclosing lender's bid was about 5.1 percent of the fair market value of the
property interest foreclosed. Id. at 165.
198. TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. § 51.002(d) (Vernon 1995).
199. TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. § 51.002(b) (Vernon 1995).
200. Mills, 58 S.W.3d at 167.
201. 51 S.W.3d 341 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 2001, no pet.).
202. Apparently as a means of giving her security for payment by the homestead for her
share of the home.
203. Id. at 344.
204. TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. § 62.003 (West Supp. 2001).
205. Tex. Att'y Gen. Op. JC-0357, at *5 (2001).
206. Id. at *1.




This opinion provoked an almost immediate proposal by lenders to
amend the homestead provisions of the Texas Constitution, already top-
heavy with provisions in favor of creditors. In November, 2001 the
amendment to article XVI, section 50(a) passed handily by about fifty-
eight percent of the vote. For good measure the amendment also in-
cluded a provision 20 9 shortening the time from twelve days to five for a
written application for a loan.
IV. DIVISION OF MARITAL PROPERTY ON DIVORCE
A. PROPERTY SETTLEMENT AGREEMENTS
In the wake of an appellate adjudication of a prior dispute in the course
of the husband's appeal of a divorce decree,210 the Fort Worth Court of
Appeals took up the appeal in Boyd v. Boyd211 concerning the validity of
a mediated property settlement. Prior to the trial the wife had become
aware of her husband's failure to disclose a substantial community prop-
erty asset that he had earned and was about to receive, and the wife
therefore rejected the mediated settlement agreement, which by the
terms of Family Code section 6.602(b)212 is irrevocable if signed by both
parties and their attorney. The trial court set aside the settlement and
proceeded to divide the couple's community estate. The appellate court
rejected the husband's appeal, while pointing out that settlement agree-
ments are not binding when one party withdraws unless the other party
sues successfully to enforce the settlement as binding under Rule 11.213
The husband defended his position on the ground that he had not failed
to file an answer in formal discovery which was not yet due at the time
the mediation was conducted. The trial court had evidently regarded the
husband's information as intentionally withheld and affirmed its rejection
of the mediated settlement.21 4 The standard for setting aside the settle-
ment agreement is certainly less exacting than that required for a bill of
review, but this challenge of the validity of the settlement occurred in
trial and not after judgment. In this situation the motion came up on
direct appeal and not on collateral attacks.215
208. Id. at *3.
209. TEX. CONST. art. XVI, § 50(a)(5)(6) (West Supp. 2002).
210. In re Boyd, 34 S.W.3d 708 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth, 2000, pet. filed), briefly noted
on a procedural point in Joseph W. McKnight, Family Law: Husband and Wife, 54 SMU L.
REV. 1383, 1404 (2001). A seemingly conditional mediated property settlement also failed
in its purpose in In re Kasschau, 11 S.W.3d 305 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2000, no
pet.), also noted in McKnight, 54 SMU L. REV. at 1399.
211. 67 S.W.3d 398 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 2002, no pet.).
212. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 6.602(b) (Vernon 1998).
213. TEX. R. Civ. P. 11.
214. Boyd v. Boyd, 67 S.W. 3d at 403. The court relied on the rejection of the seem-
ingly conditional mediated property settlement in In re Kassachaw, 11 S.W. 3d 305, op. cit.,
also noted in Joseph W. McKnight, note 210, at 1399.
215. For a particularly egregious case of fraud that provoked a successful bill of review,
see In re Ham, 59 S.W.3d 326 (Tex. App.-Texarkana 2001, no pet.).
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In In re Marriage of Nolder216 the husband and wife had entered into a
property settlement agreement by which the wife would be awarded fifty-
five percent of the husband's stock options. In the course of the negotia-
tions the husband did not reveal that he had exercised the options to
avoid their expiration and that he had already sold the stock and rein-
vested the proceeds in a manner such that there was some risk of loss. By
the time of the trial the investment of the proceeds of sale had neverthe-
less fortuitously increased in value. The trial court awarded the wife the
value of fifty-five percent of the options and all the gains represented by
the reinvestment. In affirming the trial court's judgment the appellate
court concluded that the wife was in equity entitled by mutation-tracing
principles to the gains attributable to the property dealt with in the settle-
ment agreement.2 17 The ex-wife's claim was not merely that of a creditor
against a debtor.218
In Stewart v. Stine219 an alleged third-party beneficiary of a contract
sought to recover on a term of a property settlement agreement.220 To
buy a house in 1984, a husband and wife had borrowed $100,000 from the
wife's mother. During the following year one-half the loan was repaid.
The couple was divorced in 1992. Their property settlement agreement
(incorporated in the divorce decree) provided that the wife would have
occupancy of the house, and she agreed to make mortgage payments on
the purchase-money note and to maintain the property until its sale. It
was further agreed that on sale the husband would pay closing costs, the
outstanding mortgage debt, and the debt owed to the wife's mother. Af-
ter all those payments, any of the sales proceeds remaining would be di-
vided equally between the parties, but if no proceeds remained, both
parties agreed to discharge the debt to the mother in equal shares. It was
further agreed that either party might seek appointment of a receiver to
sell the property at any time. In 1995 the ex-husband sold the home, and
the proceeds were insufficient to repay the mother. In 1998 the mother
sued the ex-husband claiming that she was a third-party beneficiary of the
property settlement agreement. She asserted a breach of the contract
claim under general law, rather than enforcement of the agreement inci-
dent to division as provided in the Family Code. The Fort Worth appel-
late court supported its judgment for the ex-husband in reliance on
Brown v. Fullenweider.221 The Fort Worth court held that because the
216. 48 S.W.3d 432 (Tex. App.-Texarkana 2001, no pet.).
217. Id. at 434-35.
218. Id.
219. 57 S.W.3d 94 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 2001, no pet.).
220. Such a property settlement agreement must be entered into in writing or entered
into in open court under TEX. R. Civ. P. 11 as reflected in the record of the court. A mere
recital in the judgment that the parties entered into such an agreement will not suffice.
Schlafly v. Schlafly, 33 S.W.3d 863, 872 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2000, no pet.).
221. Stewart, 57 S.W.3d at 101-02 (relying on Brown v. Fullenweider, 52 S.W.3d 169
(Tex. 2001)); see also Joseph W. McKnight, Family Law: Husband and Wife, 54 SMU L.
REV. 1383, 1414-15 (2001).
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mother was not a party to the contract, she could not recover.222 She
was, furthermore, neither a donee-beneficiary nor a creditor-beneficiary
of the contract because she could not enforce her statute-barred debt and
because the agreement contained no acknowledgment of the debt as sub-
sisting.223 A creditor-beneficiary status, the court said, arises only when
performance of the contract is in satisfaction of a legal obligation. 224 As
in Brown, which also involved enforcing an agreement incident to di-
vorce, the court stated that the contract was enforceable only between the
parties. The court went on to say225 that only the ex-wife had the right to
enforce the contract. 226 The mother was merely an incidental beneficiary
of the property settlement agreement; therefore, she lacked standing to
sue the ex-husband for breach. 227 Hence, the trial court was without sub-
ject matter jurisdiction. 228
B. ADJUDICATION OF DIVISION
1. Just and Right Division
In making an equitable division of the community estate in Wright v.
Wright,229 the trial court awarded eighty-eight percent of the property to
the wife. The court considered several factors in making this decision: the
length of the marriage (thirty-two years), the husband's contribution to
the marital breakdown, the husband's education and earning capacity, the
wife's lack of education and inability to engage in business, the husband's
good health, the wife's extremely bad health, the husband's excessive al-
cohol consumption, and the husband's physical and mental abuse of the
wife.230 After announcing its decision, the trial court stated that religion
was not a factor in the division. The court, however, went on to "offer...
a word of encouragement" to the wife231 by reading a passage from the
Old Testament.232 The Eastland Court of Appeals rejected the husband's
complaint that the trial court's division of the property was based on re-
ligious grounds.233
In Lifshutz v. Lifshutz234 the San Antonio Court of Appeals dealt with
an alter ego case involving five corporate and partnership entities in all of
which (but one) the husband's separate property owned a minority inter-
222. Stewart, 57 S.W.3d at 99-100 (citing MCI Telecomm. Corp. v. Texas Utils. Elec.
Co., 995 S.W.2d 647, 651 (Tex. 1999)).
223. Id. at 103-04.
224. Id. at 103.
225. Id. at 100.
226. Id. at 102. But the court did not address the applicability of TEX. FAM. CODE
ANN. § 9.003(b) (Vernon 1998); Stewart, 57 S.W.3d at 103 n.1.
227. Id. at 101-02.
228. Id. 99-100, 101-02.
229. 65 S.W.3d 715, 716 (Tex. App.-Eastland 2001, no pet.).
230. Id. at 716.
231. Id. at 718.
232. BOOK OF ISAIAH, ch. 54.
233. Wright, 65 S.W.3d at 718.
234. 61 S.W.3d 511 (Tex. App.- San Antonio 2001, no pet.).
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est. These entities intervened in the divorce proceeding, asserting breach
of fiduciary duty against the husband, its principal officer. Although the
appellate court did not address all of the trial court's findings, it is appar-
ent that the husband used his position to enrich the community estate
contrary to the interest of the entities. But there was apparently no find-
ing of fact as to the enrichment of the husband's separate property and, if
so, whether it was due to an increase in value or due to the operation of
the entities. Nor was there any fact finding as to whether there was a
boundary between the husband's personal interest and those of the enti-
ties. The trial judge found, however, that despite the husband's minority
interests in all but one of the entities, those entities were his alter-egos
and therefore the judge divided their property as the couple's community
estate.235 Although the appellate court rightly rejected the entities' asser-
tion that an entity had to be wholly owned by the person controlling it for
the alter-ego principle to operate, the appellate court did not seem to
require that the managing spouse own a controlling interest in order to
show an alter-ego relationship.2 36 The appellate court defined an alter-
ego relationship in the divorce context as dependent on (1) a "unity be-
tween the separate property [entity] and the spouse such that the sepa-
rateness of the [entity] has ceased to exist and (2) ... use of the [entity to
damage] the community estate beyond that which might be remedied by
a claim for reimbursement. '237 Despite finding that the husband
breached his fiduciary duty in favor of the community estate, the trial
court made no award of damages or a finding of a constructive trust in
favor of the intervenors. 238 The wife nonetheless was awarded twenty-
five percent of the community property, apparently amplified by the as-
sets of the entities that were said to be alter-egos of the husband.2 39
The appellate court curiously concluded that the corporate and part-
nership veils should not be pierced because the community estate was not
only unharmed but enhanced by the husband's dealings.240 Because the
court regarded piercing of the corporate veil as improper, the appeals
court concluded that the husband's separate property had been improp-
erly invaded in the division of the community estate.241 The issue of lia-
bility for breach of fiduciary duty was remanded to the trial court.242 The
appellate court further concluded that because any change in the judg-
ment of the trial court "on liability or damages for breach of fiduciary
duty could potentially result in a loss of property [by] both the commu-
235. Id. at 514.
236. Jensen v. Jensen, 665 S.W.2d 107 (Tex. 1984) (finding that a separate interest of
47.5 percent plus an interest of 2.5 percent as trustee for others constituted actual control
to invoke the alter-ego principle).
237. Lifshutz, 61 S.W.3d at 517.
238. Id. at 514.
239. Id.
240. Id. at 517-18.
241. Id. at 518.
242. Lifshutz, 61 S.W.3d at 519.
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nity estate and [the wife's] separate estate, '2 43 the property divisions
should also be remanded to the trial court.244
In Egelhoff v. Egelhoff2 45 the United States Supreme Court tightened
the application of federal preemption doctrine on the interpretation of
employee-retirement plans under the Employee Retirement Income Se-
curity Act of 1974 (ERISA). 246 For those plans under its control the Act
provides that administrators of ERISA plans must pay benefits according
to "the documents and instruments governing the plan" rather than sim-
ply looking to a particular state law as determinative.247 Thus the law of
the state of Washington did not necessarily determine the taker of an
employee's life insurance policy under a retirement plan governed by
ERISA. Rather the terms of the plan must govern the outcome. In this
instance under a Washington statute a divorce terminated the beneficial
designation of a spouse as beneficiary of a life insurance policy subject to
a plan. Under the Court's holding in Egelhoff the plan administrator
must look to the terms of the plan for that determination though the
same result would be reached if the plan actually provided that the statu-
tory law of that state was determinative. Hence, under Egelhoff sections
9.301 and 9.302 of the Family Code, 248 as well as sections 7.003 and
7.005,249 do not automatically determine such matters unless the plan so
directs. But plans beyond the coverage of ERISA as well as private in-
come retirement accounts seem to be governed by those provisions.250
In Barnett v. Barnett251 the Texas Supreme Court dealt with a term life
insurance policy acquired during marriage by the husband through his
employer's pension benefit plan. Reading Egelhoff as holding that any
state rule that departs from the designation of the insured is preempted
by ERISA, the majority of the Texas Supreme Court concluded that the
husband's designation of his estate as beneficiary of the policy should
prevail over his widow's claim in favor of the community estate.252 Four
judges, however, concluded that the majority of the court had read Egel-
hoff too strictly in favor of the doctrine of preemption. The majority's
result meant, in effect, that application of ERISA preemption not only
determines the disposition of the insurance proceeds but also precludes
the claim of the community estate to a one-half interest in those pro-
243. Id.
244. Id.
245. 532 U.S. 141 (2001).
246. 29 U.S.C. § 1144(a) (1974).
247. Id. § 1104 (a)(1)(D).
248. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. §§ 9.301, 9.302 (Vernon 1998).
249. §§ 7.003, 7.005.
250. The federal Supreme Court's decision in Egelhoff is merely cited but not discussed
in Donald T. Bogan, ERISA: The Savings Clause, § 502 Implied Preemption, Complete
Preemption, and State Law Remedies, 42 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 105, 109 n.14 (2001).
251. 67 S.W.3d 107 (Tex. 2001).
252. 29 U.S.C. § 1003(a). Though the majority of the Texas Supreme Court seemed to
lean in favor of applying the inception of title rule to the term insurance policy, it was not
required to make that decision in light of the fact that the policy in issue was not a renewal
of a premarital policy though there were premarital policy interests that it replaced.
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ceeds, an outcome similar to that in Free v. Bland.253
2. Retirement Benefits
The divorcing couple in Limbaugh v. Limbaugh 254 were married in
Spain in 1974 and lived in the United States for sixteen years before mov-
ing to Texas in 1993, after the husband retired from the Navy. After mov-
ing to Texas, the couple obtained a divorce. This divorce, however,
occurred before the amendment of the Texas Family Code section
6.711255 was effective. This amendment requires the trial court, after a
proper request, to characterize and value all familial assets on which dis-
puted evidence was presented. In Limbaugh the husband had requested
a valuation of each item of the community estate, but the trial court made
no findings as to value. On the husband's appeal the court found that
there were only a few items on which the parties presented disputed evi-
dence. The appellate court concluded that the divorce court divided the
community property "roughly equally," though by the valuations of each
there was a "not material" disparity in favor of the wife. 256 With respect
to the husband's naval retirement benefits, he had designated his wife as
beneficiary to a survivor-benefit annuity; the appellate court affirmed the
trial court's order, allowing this designation to stand altered as federal
law allows.257 In addition to the trial court's award to the wife of her
community share in the husband's naval retirement benefits, the appel-
late court modified a portion of the trial court's decree that had ordered
the husband to pay his wife any decrease in her share of the monthly
naval retirement payments that might occur because of an increase in his
disability benefits. 258 The appellate court held that this order was beyond
the trial court's power because, if the husband was required to pay that
amount involuntarily, his rights under federal law would be curtailed. 259
3. Emotional Distress
In her suit for divorce, the wife in Toles v. Toles260 sought damages
from her husband for intentional infliction of emotional distress. During
the trial the jury heard evidence of the husband's physical and verbal
abuse and his destruction of her property.261 Ultimately, the jury
awarded the wife $320,000 in damages.262 The trial judge, however,
granted the husband's motion in denying the recovery.263 On appeal the
Dallas court stated that the husband's conduct was relevant to the wife's
253. 369 U.S. 663 (1962).
254. 71 S.W.3d 1 (Tex. App.-Waco 2002, no pet.).
255. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 6.711 (Vernon Supp. 2002).
256. Limbaugh, 71 S.W3d at 10.
257. Id. at 15 (citing 10 U.S.C. § 1450(f)(4)).
258. Id. at 18 (citing 10 U.S.C. § 1450(f)(4)).
259. Id. at 17-18 (citing Ex parte Burson, 615 S.W.2d 192, 196 (Tex. 1981)).
260. 45 S.W.3d 252 (Tex. App.-Dallas 2001, no pet.).
261. Id. at 260.
262. Id. at 258.
263. Id. at 258.
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claim. 264 The court found that the evidence was sufficient to support the
jury's findings (1) that he had acted intentionally or recklessly, (2) that his
conduct was extreme and outrageous, (3) that his outrageous conduct had
caused his wife emotional distress, and (4) that the emotional distress suf-
fered was severe. 265 The court noted that "intentional conduct requires a
showing that the actor desired the consequences of his act."'266 The court
also stressed that in a divorce case "[a] spouse should not be allowed to
recover tort damages and a disproportionate division of the community
estate based on the same conduct. '267 In this instance, however, the ap-
pellate court said that there was no point in the husband's even challeng-
ing the division of the property and affirmed the trial court's judgment. 268
4. Attorney's Fees
In Beard v. Beard the trial court awarded the wife $1,500 as "reasona-
ble and necessary attorney's fees,"269 though she had claimed $60,000 in
attorney's fees, which the trial court did not regard as justified. The court
also intimated that an award of attorney's fees in divorce cases is exclu-
sively based on the division of property.270 There is nonetheless room for
interpretation of earlier caselaw indicating that attorney's fees are recov-
erable as necessary. 271 This is especially so when a destitute or nearly
destitute spouse is the respondent in a divorce proceeding and there is
little property to divide.
During the divorce hearing on property issues in Toles.272 the husband
requested that the court sanction his wife and her attorney for groundless
pleadings concerning the husband's adultery, non-existent financial
causes of action, and numerous abuses of the trial process. Though the
court ordered the wife to pay $120,000 in sanctions to her husband, the
court did not specify which conduct the court considered sanctionable.
273
The Dallas appellate court held that the sanctions could not stand be-
cause the particulars of the cause for sanctions were not specified as re-
quired by Rule 13.274 As to the sanction for alleged pretrial discovery
abuse, the sanction could not be upheld because the husband had not
obtained a pretrial ruling on the discovery abuse under former Rule
264. Id. at 261.
265. Toles, 45 S.W.3d at 261.
266. Id. at 259 (internal citations omitted).
267. Id. at 264-65.
268. Id. at 265.
269. Beard, 49 S.W.3d 40 (Tex. App.-Waco 2001, no pet.).
270. Id. at 64.
271. See Carle v. Carle, 149 Tex. 469, 234 S.W.2d 1002 (1951).
272. 45 S.W.3d at 266. The case was tried under former Tex. R. Civ. P. 215 (1990),
amended by orders of Aug. 5. 1998 and Nov. 9, 1998, eff. Jan. 1, 1999. But the amendments
to the rule made no substantial change that would have affected the outcome of the case if
its facts had occurred in 1999 or later.
273. Toles, 45 S.W.3d at 266-67.
274. TEX. R. Civ. P. 13 (citing Barnum v. Munson, Munson, Pierce and Cardwell, P.C.,
998 S.W.2d 284, 287 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1999, pet. denied); Gorman v. Gorman, 966
S.W.2d 858, 867-68 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1998, pet. denied)).
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215.275 In that the trial court had awarded attorney's fees as a sanction,
the husband agreed that the sanction might be affirmed as attorney's fees
in the divorce suit. The appellate court responded that a trial court does
not have an inherent power to award attorney's fees in a divorce case.
Though a trial court may award attorney's fees in making a property divi-
sion, it failed to do so in this instance.
In Haase v. Herberger276 the husband and wife filed suit against build-
ers regarding the construction of their community homestead. While that
action was in progress, the wife sued for divorce. The builders then made
a settlement offer that the wife wanted to accept, but the husband re-
fused. The wife's attorney then filed a motion for permission to settle the
construction case, and the divorce court granted her motion. Acting
under the court's order, the wife accepted the offer. The couple's counsel
in the construction matter then filed a plea in intervention in the divorce
suit for disbursement of the funds that counsel claimed as a contingent
fee. The husband objected and counterclaimed for forfeiture of the fee as
an act of malpractice based on the factual difference of opinion between
the spouses as to whether the offer should have been accepted. Putting
aside enough of the settlement proceeds to cover attorney's fees and ex-
penses, the divorce court divided the rest of the community estate.277
The husband then filed a motion for partial summary judgment for forfei-
ture of the attorney's contingent fee in the construction case. The court
gave judgment in favor of the attorney and the husband appealed in that
regard only.278 The appellate court279 concluded that the trial court's or-
der giving the wife the right to settle the construction litigation was au-
thorized by Texas Family Code section 6.502.280 Even assuming (without
deciding) that there was a breach of fiduciary duty, the court went on to
say that the trial court's order authorized her counsel to follow the wife's
direction in the matter.281 Thus, when an attorney represents two clients
in the same matter and they disagree on the acceptance of a settlement
offer, the trial court may order which client's direction should be fol-
lowed.2 82 Such a judicial order, therefore, can supersede the terms of the
contract between the clients and the attorney as to approval of a settle-
ment.2 83 If that should happen, the court went on to say, the clients' suc-
cess in the dispute would depend on proof of damages, which had not
been developed at the trial in this matter.284
275. Toles, 45 S.W.3d at 266 (citing Remington Arms Co. v. Caldwell. 850 S.W.2d 167,
170 (Tex. 1993)).
276. 44 S.W.3d 267 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2001, no pet.).
277. Id. at 269.
278. Id.
279. Id.
280. Id. at 270; TEX. FAM. CODE § 6.5202 (Vernon 1998).
281. Haase, 44 S.W.3d at 270.
282. Id.





As awards for spousal maintenance have increased, enforcement ef-
forts have also increased. In Lopez v. Lopez285 the couple divorced after
being married over ten years. The wife was in very bad health and her
earning capacity was very limited.286 The court awarded the wife part of
the community property and spousal maintenance for three years as
well.287 Over the husband's objection, the trial court's award of spousal
maintenance was sustained.288 The appellate court only dealt with the ex-
wife's meeting statutory standards for the award.289
In a divorce from a marriage of only two years' duration, in Pickens v.
Pickens290 the court awarded spousal maintenance payments for an in-
definite period as long as the wife's disabilities made her unable to sup-
port herself. This award was also sustained without expert testimony to
support the wife's testimony concerning her incapacitating physical disa-
bility.291 Because the statute does not require expert medical testimony
of incapacity, the Dallas appellate court sustained the trial court's find-
ing.292 Family Code section 8.008293 provides, nevertheless, that a modifi-
cation in such a maintenance order can be sought as a result of material
change in circumstances.
In Limbaugh v. Limbaugh294 the husband contested an award of
spousal maintenance on the ground that the wife was awarded a sufficient
amount of community property and had sufficient earning ability to pro-
vide for her minimum, reasonable needs. Because the record contained
some probative evidence supporting the trial court's order, the order was
left undisturbed.2 95
D. EFFECTS OF BANKRUPTCY
In In re Kesse1296 the husband agreed to pay the wife alimony, and the
agreement was approved by the divorce court.297 In his Chapter 13 bank-
ruptcy proceeding several years later, the ex-husband sought to discharge
his maintenance obligations, which were in arrears. 298 His ex-wife con-
tested his discharge 299 on the ground that, despite the designation of their
contact as for alimony for the benefit of the ex-husband's federal taxes,
285. 55 S.W.3d 194 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 2001, no pet.).
286. Id. at 197-99.
287. Id. at 198.
288. Id. at 197-99. On page 199 a printer once again misspelled a vital word of the
maxim de minimis non curat lex.
289. Id. at 197.
290. 62 S.W.3d 212, 214 (Tex. App.-Dallas 2001, no pet.).
291. Id. at 215-16.
292. Id. at 215.
293. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 8.008 (Vernon 1998).
294. 71 S.W.3d 1 (Tex. App.-Waco 2002, no pet.).
295. Id. at 15.
296. 261 B.R. 902, 904 (Bankr. E.D. Tex. 2001).
297. Id.
298. Id. at 905-06.
299. Id. at 906.
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the contract was not a property settlement disguised as alimony but com-
pensation to the wife along with support payments for the vast differ-
ences in earning power of the parties. Hence, the provisions of the
contract were correctly designated as alimony.300 Thus, the contract was
not dischargeable in bankruptcy. 301
E. ENFORCEMENT AND CLARIFICATION
In Reiss v. Reiss30 2 the unappealed 1980 divorce decree was rendered
three years before the Texas Supreme Court held in Berry v. Berry that,
for the purpose of division, retirement benefits must be valued at the date
of divorce.30 3 In response to the ex-husband's argument that enforce-
ment of the decree constituted an unconstitutional divestiture of his sepa-
rate property, the appellate court refused to allow a collateral attack on
the judgment, though it was clearly contrary to the rule in Berry. Thus,
the ex-wife's suit to receive her share of the retirement benefits as fixed
by the erroneous (but not void) decree was successful.
Mastin v. Mastin304 dealt with a means of making the payment of con-
tractual alimony more efficacious. The husband's agreed alimony pay-
ments had been incorporated in the divorce decree, under which the wife
had the option to accelerate payments if the husband defaulted. 30 5 The
ex-husband had been in partial default for a number of years.306 In 1999
the ex-wife demanded full payment and noted her option to accelerate.
After the ex-husband's failure to respond, the ex-wife sued and again
stated her option to accelerate payments.30 7 The ex-husband asserted
that his ex-wife failed to give notice of her right to accelerate payment.
The San Antonio Court of Appeals agreed with the ex-husband's argu-
ment with respect to the requirement of unequivocal notice of accelera-
tion in light of the severity of the remedy.308
In re Alford309 serves as a reminder that when drawing a judgment con-
cerning airline-reward-miles or a similar interest, counsel should provide
that the holder of the interest take specific action to pass that interest to
the spouse awarded the interest.310 Thus a clarification proceeding may
be avoided.311 But such a term in an agreement in anticipation of divorce
300. Id. at 909.
301. Kessel, 261 B.R. at 909.
302. 40 S.W.3d 605 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 2001, no pet.), briefly noted in
Joseph W. McKnight, Family Law: Husband and Wife, 54 SMU L. REV. 1383, 1411 (2001).
303. 647 S.W.2d 945, 946 (Tex. 1983).
304. No. 04-00-00438-CV, 2001 WL 985824 (Tex. App. San Antonio 2001, no pet.).
305. Id. at *1.
306. Id.
307. Id.
308. Id. at *5.
309. 40 S.W.3d 187 (Tex. App.-Texarkana 2001, no pet.) (particular decree was not
sufficiently specific to be enforced by contempt under TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 9.006(a)
(Vernon 1998)).
310. Id. at 188-89.
311. But clarification may not be possible. An effort to clarify a post-divorce order
acceptable for processing and a qualified domestic relations order dealing with retirement
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will not give a court contempt power of enforcement and thus such a
contractual provision would not produce the same objective as a court
order.312
benefits failed in Marshall v. Priess, No. 14-99-01399-CV, 2002 WL 122509 (Tex. App.-
Houston [14th Dist.] 2002, no pet.), because the clarifications sought were actually substan-
tive changes in the former orders and thus beyond the authority of the trial court under
TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 9.007 (Vernon 1998).
312. Woolam v. Tussing, 54 S.W.3d 442 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 2001, no pet.) (Ajudicial award of spousal maintenance may be enforced by contempt under TEX. FAM.
CODE ANN § 8.009 (Vernon 1998) but not contractual alimony.)
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